Unemployment occurs when some agents, say unions, have control over the wage and set it above the market-clearing level. In other words, it is generated by their exercise of market power. What if, in addition, …rms have control over prices in the product market? In this case, market power of wage setters interacts with market power of price setters. Understanding this interaction sheds new light on the e¤ects of policy interventions on unemployment and growth. Reforms that result in lower labor costs reduce unemployment and boost growth because they expand the scale of the economy and generate more competition in the product market. The reduction in unemployment is larger than one would expect if the pro-competitive e¤ect of the reforms were ignored. These reforms, thus, are even more attractive when one considers the endogenous structure of the product market. If they are implemented jointly with a reduction of barriers to innovation in the product market, an even larger reduction in unemployment and increase in growth is achieved.
Introduction
Traditional explanations of unemployment focus on labor market rigidities and ignore the characteristics of the product market. 1 Some economists argue that this approach is ‡awed and likely to yield ine¤ective policy prescriptions (see, e.g., Solow 2000, Blanchard 2000, Blanchard and Giavazzi 2000) . In this paper, I exploit recent developments in endogenous growth theory to pursue this criticism in a speci…c direction: I argue that unemployment and productivity growth are related because they both depend on the structure of the product market, and that this relation has important implications for policy.
I start from the simple observation that most of the available explanations of unemployment posit that some agents (typically unions) have control over the wage and set it above the market-clearing level. In other words, unemployment is generated by their exercise of market power. I then ask: What if, in addition, …rms have control over prices in the product market? In this case, market power in the product market interacts with market power in the labor market. Analysis of this interaction sheds new light on the e¤ects on unemployment and growth of policy interventions in the labor and the product markets. Let me consider them separately.
Labor market institutions, tax policy and other factors a¤ect labor costs and thus unemployment. I provide two related results:
² policies that reduce labor costs reduce unemployment and raise growth; ² the reduction in unemployment due to these policies is larger when one considers their e¤ects on the structure of the product market.
To illustrate, consider the role of labor income taxes (unemployment bene…ts have similar e¤ects). Given the structure of the product market, higher labor income taxes generate higher unemployment via their traditional e¤ect on the cost of labor. The economy then operates at a smaller scale. This results in lower returns to entry and less competition in the product market which, in turn, results in higher market power for price setters. In equilibrium, the market power of price setters must equal the inverse of the market power of wage setters. The reduction in competition that raises the market power of price setters, therefore, must be matched by an increase in unemployment that reduces the market power of wage setters. Growth falls because …rms operate in a less competitive market. Summarizing, labor income taxes raise unemployment and reduce growth. This result is consistent with the evidence discussed in Nickell and Layard (1997) , who …nd that the total tax burden on labor has a negative e¤ect on growth. It is also consistent with the evidence discussed in Daveri and Tabellini (2000) , who show that the increase in unemployment and reduction in growth that occurred in the recent decades in the OECD is driven by the increase in labor income taxes. Finally, it is consistent with the evidence provided by Wu and Zhang (2000) , who show that in the OECD countries there is a positive correlation between taxation and the mark-ups that …rms charge over marginal cost. Next, I consider the role of factors that raise the cost of innovation, reduce product substitution and thus price competition, or raise entry costs for entrants but do not a¤ect incumbents. I provide three results:
² lower costs of innovation raise growth and reduce unemployment; ² tougher price competition has ambiguous e¤ects on growth and unemployment;
² lower barriers to entry do not necessarily reduce growth while reduce unemployment.
These results emphasize the importance of the details of the pro-growth policy that a country adopts. Reducing barriers to innovation is the most e¤ec-tive policy to promote growth because it reduces at the same time barriers to the creation of new …rms and barriers to innovation within the …rm. As a result, it fosters investment on both the intensive and the extensive margin and, more importantly, it exploits the positive relation between competition and growth. In so doing, it also reduces unemployment. In contrast, fostering growth by protecting incumbents -which is fairly common in Europe where governments protect "national champions" -is self-defeating because it raises unemployment by restricting competition. Moreover, less competition reduces …rms' incentives to undertake R&D so that growth might not rise at all. The analysis sketched above has two general implications concerning policy. First, labor market reforms that reduce the cost of labor, like those advocated by the OECD in its Jobs Study (1994) , have e¤ects in the product market that reinforce their direct e¤ects on unemployment. Speci…cally, these reforms boost growth because they expand the scale of the economy, attract entry, and thus generate more competition in the product market. Since the rise in product market competition further reduces unemployment, the reduction in unemployment that these reforms generate is larger than one would expect if the product market e¤ect of lower labor costs were ignored. In other words, the reforms advocated by the OECD are even more attractive when one considers the positive feedback that runs through the endogenous structure of the product market.
The second implication stems from a positive feedback in the other direction. Product market reforms that foster innovation reduce unemployment because they attract entry and generate more competition in the product market. The reduction in unemployment expands the economy's scale of activity and attracts more entry, which further boosts R&D spending by …rms. Hence, the acceleration in growth that these reforms generate is larger than one would expect if the labor market e¤ect of lower barriers to innovation were ignored. These results provide a theoretical rationale for the pro-competitive reforms advocated in a series of studies undertaken at the McKinsey Global Institute (1995, 1997) , and show that these reforms are even more attractive when one considers the positive feedback on market structure and growth that runs through the labor market. 2 One feature of my approach drives these results. In order to focus on market power, I deviate from the existing literature on growth and unemployment that follows the "creative destruction" tradition. 3 I consider a model where growth is driven by the activities of …rms that are not put out of business by outside innovators but are long-lived pro…t centers that innovate repeatedly in-house. 4 The main di¤erence between the two approaches is that "creative destruction" models exhibit a negative relation between product market competition and growth, while the "creative accumulation" model that I consider exhibits a positive relation. This relation, supported empirically by the recent work of Nickell (1996) and Pagano and Schivardi (2000) , has the important implication that a more competitive product market generates both faster growth and lower unemployment. Moreover, in "creative destruction" models the degree of competition is pinned down by an exogenous parameter whereas in my "creative accumulation" model it depends on the number of …rms, which is endogenous.
I organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, I set up the model. In Section 3, I study the product market and characterize the relation between competition and growth. In Section 4, I study the labor market and show how the exercise of market power by a monopoly union generates unemployment. In Section 5, I study the general equilibrium of the model and show how the interaction of market power in the product and labor markets determines unemployment, market structure, and growth. In Section 6, I discuss the e¤ects of structural parameters and policy instruments. I conclude in Section 7.
The Model
Consider a closed economy with one representative household with¸mem-bers.¸is constant. Each member of the household is endowed with one unit of labor. When employed, the members of the household belong to monopoly unions that operate at the …rm level. For simplicity, I assume that the capital market is competitive.
Production, Innovation and Entry
There is a …nal good that can be consumed or invested. The …nal good is produced by assembling di¤erentiated intermediate goods according to
where e (N ) is the elasticity of product substitution, X i is the …nal producer's use of each di¤erentiated good, and N is the mass of intermediate goods (the mass of intermediate …rms). The …nal good is the numeraire. The elasticity of substitution is an increasing function of the mass of …rms, bounded from above and from below, 1 > e (1) > e (1) > 1. This allows me to capture the role of endogenous market power while retaining the desirable features of a monopolistic competition model de…ned over a continuum of goods. 5 The …nal producer maximizes pro…ts subject to the budget constraint Y = R N 1 P i X i di, where P i is the price of intermediate good i. This yields 5 The traditional approach to generating endogenous market power from CES preferences is to de…ne the number of goods as an integer and allow the typical …rm to internalize the demand schedule faced by …rm i,
Notice that the price index of intermediate goods -which the atomistic intermediate …rms take as given -must be equal to the price of the …nal good and thus is equal to one. The typical intermediate …rm produces with the technology
where X i is output, L i is labor and Z i is the …rm's cumulated stock of cost-reducing innovations. Firms run in-house R&D facilities to produce a continuous ‡ow of innovations according to
where _ Z i is the ‡ow of innovations generated by an R&D project employing R Z i units of the …nal good for an interval of time dt. Entrepreneurs create new …rms by running R&D projects that develop new products and their manufacturing processes. I assume that the entry level of productivity is equal to average productivity, Z, and that the cost of entry is proportional to the entry level of productivity. This captures the idea that entrants face escalating R&D entry costs because of the industry's ongoing technological advance. This setup allows me to posit the entry technology
its e¤ect on the industry's price index. For example, I could de…ne
In symmetric equilibrium the price elasticity of the demand curve for product i is
which features the qualitative properties that I posit in the text and yields results similar to those that I discuss in the paper. My formulation with a continuum of goods is more ‡exible and allows me to sidestep some technical issues that I would need to address if I took this approach.
where R N is the amount of …nal good devoted to starting up _ N new …rms for an interval of time dt. The parameter¯captures non-R&D components of the entry cost by reducing the overall productivity of resources devoted to entry. The important feature of this parameter is that it does not a¤ect incumbents. Hence, it captures exogenous barriers to entry.
Consumption, Saving and Labor Supply
The household maximizes
where ½ is the individual discount rate, C is consumption, L s is the number of household members that o¤er their labor for a wage, A is assets holding, and T is a lump sum transfer from the government. The assets available to the household are ownership shares of …rms. Hence, r is the rate of return on stocks. Three things are new in this setup. First, the instantaneous utility of the household contains a term that captures the role of household members that do not participate in the labor market; one can think of home production or other related activities the output of which is shared by all household members. Second, the budget constraint contains the household's expected income: each household member that participates in the labor market earns the after-tax wage W (1 ¡ ¿ ) if he is employed and the unemployment bene…t B if he is unemployed. The probability of being employed is p e ; the probability of being unemployed is p u . 6 The maximization problem outlined above has a well-known structure. First, the household sets
6 Implicit in this setup is the assumption that the household insures its members participating in the labor market against unemployment. This simpli…es the analysis because it ensures that all household members get the same ‡ow of consumption and therefore of utility. Notice that I am also assuming that participation in the labor market prevents the individual from contributing to household production even if he is unemployed; one can think that participation while unemployed takes up the individual's time as much as if he were working. Relaxing this assumption by allowing unemployed individuals to work at home complicates the analysis but does not change the qualitative results of the model. Taking as given this time-path of consumption, the household chooses labor supply. This yields
Labor supply is decreasing in consumption, C, and increasing in the wage, W , and the unemployment bene…t, B. I now turn to the probabilities. Given labor demand
where L s is the household labor supply derived above. Assuming random allocation of work among household members participating in the labor market, I can write p u = u and p e = 1 ¡ u. This implies that labor supply depends on the unemployment rate via two e¤ects. First, lower unemployment means that the participating individual is more likely to be employed and this raises the expected bene…t of participation. Second, the individual is less likely to be unemployed and thus to draw the bene…t B, which reduces the expected bene…t of participation. I show below that the model's equilibrium conditions imply W (1 ¡ ¿ ) > B so that labor supply is decreasing in the unemployment rate.
The Product Market
In this section, I construct the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the intermediate sector of the economy. The …rm's production technology yields the cost function
Firms maximize the present discounted value of net cash ‡ow,
subject to the demand schedule (1), the cost function (7), the R&D function (3), Z i (0) = Z > 0 (the initial knowledge stock is given), Z j (t) for t > 0 and j 6 = i (the …rm takes as given the rivals' innovation paths), and _ Z j (t) for t > 0 (innovation is irreversible). Instantaneous pro…ts are
where R Z i is R&D expenditure. With perfect foresight, V i is the stock market value of the …rm, the price of the ownership share of an equity holder. The …rm's problem can be split in the following stages.
First, facing demand (1) the …rm sets
Substituting this expression in the cost function (7) yields labor demand
Given these instantaneous choices of price and scale of operations, the …rm …nances R&D by issuing ownership claims on the ‡ow of pro…ts generated by cost-reducing innovations. Let the market value of such …nancial assets be q i . The …rm is willing to undertake R&D if the value of the innovation is equal to its cost,
Since the innovation is implemented in-house, its bene…ts are determined by the marginal pro…t it generates. Thus, the return to the innovation must satisfy the arbitrage condition
Using the cost function (7) and the price strategy (9), I can write
Taking logs and time derivatives of q i = 1 ® , substituting into (11) and rearranging terms yields
which de…nes the rate of return to in-house innovation. The value of the …rm must satisfy the arbitrage condition
which is obtained by taking logs and time-derivatives of (8) . Entry costs ® Z and produces value V i . Entrants are active if the value of entry is equal to its cost, V i =®Z () _ N > 0. Taking logs and time derivatives and substituting into (13) , I obtain
Using the cost function (7), the price strategy (9) and the expression for pro…ts, I obtain
This is the rate of return to entry (…rm ownership).
In symmetric equilibrium, I have
Hence:
where g´_ Z Z is the rate of growth of labor productivity, which determines growth of income per capita in this economy. These equations de…ne the returns to two types of investment. No-arbitrage in the capital market requires that they yield equal rates of return.
To study the properties of the Nash equilibrium, one can represent the interaction of incumbents and entrants in a diagram with the rate of return, r, on the vertical axis and growth, g, on the horizontal axis. The equilibrium with positive growth is at the intersection of the horizontal line (15) with the upward sloping line (16). 7 It exists if (15) is higher than the intercept of (16), otherwise (15) and (16) cross for a negative value of g, the nonnegativity constraint on R&D is binding, and g = 0. In order to focus the analysis and streamline the presentation, I impose the following restriction
which ensures that the interior equilibrium exists for all N. If this condition does not hold, there exists a threshold N 0 such that g > 0 for N > N 0 and g = 0 for 1 · N · N 0 . Analysis of the model in this case is feasible but complicated by the fact that one needs to worry about the corner solution and the endogenous regime switch that it implies (see Peretto 1998) . Since this feature is not essential to understanding the interaction of growth and unemployment, I rule it out. The conclusion of this discussion is that in equilibrium growth is
and the associated rate of return to R&D and entry is
According to (17) , growth is increasing in the …rm's scale of operations, Y N . To see why, note that the rate of return to R&D increases with the scale of production over which cost-reducing innovations apply. Similarly, the rate of return to entry increases with the anticipated scale of production of the …rm. In both cases, the intuition is that R&D and entry costs are …xed costs that larger …rms spread over larger volumes of production. Recent work by Klepper (1996a, 1996b ) and Adams and Ja¤e (1996) shows that this cost-spreading mechanism is important in explaining the role of …rm size emphasized in many empirical studies.
The Labor Market
My setup for the labor market follows Daveri and Tabellini (2000) with the di¤erence that here …rms are not competitive and that labor supply is elastic. Wages are set by monopoly unions that operate at the …rm level and maximize the di¤erence between the after-tax wage and the unemployment bene…t for the …rms' employees. 8 The typical union's problem is
8 In my setup the alternative to the wage paid by the …rm is the unemployment bene…t because the individual who participates in the labor market cannot take part in household production. Moreover, I assume that the bene…t is not taxed. This is extreme, but it is simply meant to capture the fact that unemployment bene…ts are taxed more lightly than wages; see Daveri and Tabellini (2000, pp. 58-59) for evidence on this point. Notice, …nally, that assuming that the union maximizes the surplus for an employed worker yields the same results as assuming that the union maximizes in a utilitarian fashion the expected where L i is the …rm's labor demand given by (10) . This yields
This wage-setting relation is the traditional mark-up rule for a monopolist, where
is the marginal (opportunity) cost of working for a wage and e W i is the wage elasticity of labor demand. To characterize this condition more sharply, I use the demand schedule (1) and the production function (2) to rewrite labor demand (10) as
This yields
which says that labor demand becomes more elastic as a result of product market competition. This follows from the fact that an increase in the wage raises the …rm's marginal cost and this has a larger e¤ect on the …rm's scale of production -and thus labor demand -the tougher is price competition in the product market. The wage-setting relation then reads
As I show below, this expression implies that the wage is above the marketclearing level so that there is unemployment. To characterize the labor market more sharply, it is useful to assume that the government cannot borrow and satis…es the budget constraint
, which determines the lump-sum transfer, T , as the di¤erence between tax revenues and expenditure on bene…ts. 9 It also useful income of those who participate in the labor market. This, in turn, is consistent with individual utility maximization because households insure their members against the risk of unemployment. 9 This setup keeps to a minimum the e¤ect of the government on economic activity. Only two distortions matter: taxation, which lowers labor supply and raises the wage that unions demand, and the unemployment bene…t, which raises both labor supply and the wage that unions demand.
to assume that the unemployment bene…t is a constant fraction of income per capita. I thus posit B = ¾ Y . This yields
Aggregate labor demand is
Employment is decreasing in the tax rate and the replacement ratio, and increasing in product market competition.
To show that the monopoly wage (19) generates unemployment, I now use (LL) and (6) , to obtain an implicit equation,
which determines the rate of unemployment as a function decreasing in N and C Y and increasing in ¾ and ¿ . The rate of unemployment is decreasing in the consumption ratio because higher consumption reduces labor supply.
To see in …ner detail what lies behind equation (20) , the following textbook interpretation is useful (see, e.g., Blanchard 1996, chapter 17) . Begin by noticing the following relation between L and u that I obtain from the de…nition of unemployment and (LL):
I can now use the expression for the monopoly wage to obtain the following wage-setting relation
Similarly, I can use (LL) to construct the price-setting relation
(P P ) Figure 1 illustrates the partial equilibrium of the labor market as the intersection of the W W and P P loci in (u; W ) space. By construction, (P P ) expresses the relation between the wage and production per …rm that one obtains from the …rm's pricing rule. Speci…cally, …rms' market power determines a wedge between price and marginal cost. Given the wage, this determines the level of output, the only item in the determination of production cost that is under …rms' control at a given moment in time. This produces the upward sloping price-setting relation, P P . Intuitively, higher unemployment means lower output and lower marginal cost. Since …rms' power in the product market pins down the price-cost margin, the wage must rise to o¤set the reduction in marginal cost due to the lower volume of production. In contrast, the wage-setting relation, W W , is downward sloping because higher unemployment implies lower employment, which reduces output and thus the unemployment bene…t. As a result, the union charges the same markup over a lower marginal (opportunity) cost of labor and the wage falls. 10 Equilibrium occurs where the union's market power matches the inverse of …rms' market power, that is, at the level of unemployment such that the markup that the monopolistic union charges over the marginal (opportunity) cost of labor equals the inverse of the markup that oligopolistic …rms charge over the marginal cost of production. There is thus a downward sloping relation between the number of …rms and unemployment, captured by equation (20) . An increase in the number of …rms reduces …rms' market power and shifts up the price-setting relation. 11 Equilibrium is restored by a reduction in unemployment that implies (a) higher market power of wage setters in the labor market and (b) higher output that raises producers' marginal costs and thereby reduces the price-wage margin in the product market.
General Equilibrium
In this Section, I discuss the main analytical results of the paper. I characterize the dynamics and the steady state of the model and then provide an intuitive interpretation of the results. 10 Since the unemployment bene…t is the value of the alternative for the union in a bargaining setup, the lower bene…t is interpretable as lower market power for the union. 11 The reader might have noticed that the increase in the number of …rms also shifts up both curves by the same amount because of the aggregation e¤ect of technologies that exhibit diminishing returns to scale at the …rm level. This e¤ect rises the wage but cancels out in the determination of unemployment. 
Dynamics
Associated to the employment equation (LL), there is aggregate output
which is increasing in N directly -in addition to through e (N) -because diminishing returns to scale with respect to labor imply that the economy produces more when there are many small …rms than when there are few large ones. I can now use (Y Y ) to rewrite (17) as
This equation reveals that the number of …rms determines growth at all moments in time. There are two e¤ects: the market share e¤ect, captured by the termŅ , and the rivalry e¤ect, captured by the term e¡1 e , which is increasing in N.
To characterize the general equilibrium of this economy I impose output and capital market clearing. The partial equilibrium of the labor market a¤ects the path of the economy through the output equation (Y Y ), which determines the resources constraint. The saving schedule (5) determines the rate of return to saving that the household demands. The construction of the general equilibrium of this economy is then straightforward. There is an Euler equation characterizing the equilibrium of the capital market, whereby all rates of return are equalized, and an equation characterizing the equilibrium of the goods market, whereby output is allocated to consumption and investment. The latter equation is where this model deviates from the standard setup because the state variable of this economy is the number of …rms.
To streamline the presentation, I present the details of the transition dynamics in the Appendix. The model admits the possibility of two steady states, one unstable and one stable. Since the former is not interesting I rule it out by imposing the restriction
which states that the net rate of return, r ¡ g, generated by a global monopolist (N = 1) is higher than the discount rate. Let c´Ç Z . The phase diagram in Figure 2 and the following Proposition characterize dynamics in (N; c) space.
Proposition 1 There is a unique perfect-foresight general equilibrium. If the initial number of …rms is smaller than the steady state number of …rms, N ¤ , the economy jumps on the saddle path and converges to the steady state (N ¤ ; c ¤ ). If the initial number of …rms is larger than N ¤ , the economy enters immediately a steady state with no entry.
Proof. See the Appendix. This proposition implies that there is a continuum of steady states to the right of N ¤ where the number of …rms is exogenous. This is the region of hysteresis where entry is not pro…table and the number of …rms does not respond to parameter changes.
The Interior Steady State
To characterize the interior steady state it is useful to proceed as follows. First, notice that the net rate of return must equal the discount rate, r ¡g = ½. Using (18) and (Y Y ) and (21) derived above, this condition reduces to the following implicit equation that determines the number of …rms:
(This is the _ c = 0 locus derived in the Appendix.) On the left-hand side of this equation there is the measure of …rms size ®Y N Z ; see (Y Y ). This follows from the fact that in equilibrium both the rate of return to investment and the rate of productivity growth are proportional to …rm size; see (18) and (17) . Hence, equation (N N) states that shocks and policy interventions that expand the size of the market raise …rm size and thus the pro…ts of incumbents. As a consequence, they attract entry.
I now solve (NN ) for …rm size ®Y NZ and substitute into (17) to obtain an equation that describes growth as an increasing function of market competition,
This equation holds only for equilibria where entry is pro…table. The analysis of the model's dynamics, on the other hand, shows that there are equilibria where entrants are not active. I discuss those in the next subsection. An important property of this equation is that the parameter ® is missing. This is because its e¤ects on the intensive and extensive margins are identical and thus cancel out in the arbitrage condition that equalizes the returns to R&D by incumbents and R&D by entrants. 12 Next, I construct the U U locus. Output market clearing requires Y = C + N R Z . From this and (GG) I obtain
Using (20), I then have°2
On the left-hand side of (U U ) there is the positive e¤ect of N on labor demand, which reduces unemployment. On the right-hand side, there is the e¤ect of N on labor supply. This has two components. First, product market competition raises the fraction of output devoted to R&D and thus reduces the consumption ratio. This raises labor supply. Second, product market competition raises the elasticity of labor demand and thus reduces the wage that unions set. This reduces labor supply. The plausible net e¤ect of an increase in the number of …rms is a fall in unemployment. Given this structure, to determine growth, output, employment and unemployment, I simply substitute N ¤ obtained from (NN) into, respectively, (GG), (Y Y ), (LL) and (U U ).
The positive relation between competition and growth captured by the upward sloping GG locus determines the growth e¤ects of policy interventions and exogenous shocks that a¤ect the labor market. Speci…cally, changes in labor market equilibrium are transmitted to the product market through changes in the number of …rms that produce a movement along the GG locus. This e¤ect is fully summarized by the term
12 The reader should also note that the equation does not contain terms that measure the size of the economy. Hence, the economy's labor endowment a¤ects growth only through its (positive) e¤ect on the number of …rms. As a result, the model exhibits a nonlinear scale e¤ect, bounded from above. Since I have already discussed this property of this class of models in Peretto (1998 Peretto ( , 1999 ), I do not examine this e¤ect here and refer the reader to those papers for details. which determines the cost of labor. Thus, policy interventions in the labor market that reduce the cost of labor raise the economy's scale of activity, attract entry and, as a result of the rivalry e¤ect, raise growth. This growth e¤ect is larger the less competitive is the economy and vanishes when the economy approaches the upper bound for the elasticity of substitution.
The negative relation between the number of …rms and unemployment captured by the downward sloping U U locus determines the unemployment e¤ects of policy interventions and exogenous shocks that a¤ect the product market. These are fully summarized by the two terms µ e ¡ 1 e ¶ 2 and¯e ¡°(e ¡ 1) (¯¡ 1) e ; which capture, respectively, the increase in labor demand and labor supply due to an increase in the number of …rms. One can see that policy interventions in the product market that attract entry raise employment and reduce unemployment purely because they increase competition. I discuss in details the e¤ects of interventions in the labor and product markets in the next section.
The Region of Hysteresis
I now describe the model's equilibrium when entry is not pro…table and the number of …rms does not respond to parameters changes. The rate of return to investment is given by the rate of return to R&D only. Setting r ¡ g = ½ and using (Y Y ), I obtain
Proceeding as in the previous subsection, I also obtain 8 < :°2
These equations make the analysis of the e¤ects of parameters changes very easy. (GG hysterisis ) states that growth is increasing in ® and decreasing in ¿ and ¾. (U U hysterisis ) states that unemployment is increasing in ®, ¿ and ¾. The result concerning ® might strike the reader as surprising. In fact, it is quite intuitive. According to (LL), employment is unrelated to ® since in the region of hysteresis the number of …rms is …xed. On the other hand, ® raises R&D spending which depresses consumption and raises labor supply. As a result, unemployment raises.
The E¤ects of Labor and Product Market Factors on Unemployment and Growth
The dynamic response of the economy to a change in parameters is subject to hysteresis since increases in the number of …rms are irreversible. It is thus necessary to distinguish between (a) results that characterize economies with di¤erent parameters (comparative statics results) and (b) results that characterize the response of one economy to a parameter change (comparative dynamics results).
Factors A¤ecting Labor Costs
This subsection makes two related points:
² policies that reduce labor costs reduce unemployment and raise growth;
² the reduction in unemployment due to these policies is larger when one considers the endogenous number of …rms.
To illustrate, I consider the e¤ects of labor income taxes.
Proposition 2 E¤ects of the labor income tax rate, ¿ . (a) An economy with higher ¿ converges to a steady state with lower growth, a smaller number of …rms, lower employment and higher unemployment than economies with lower ¿ . (b) In response to an increase in ¿ , the economy jumps to a steady state with lower growth, the same number of …rms, lower employment and higher unemployment. In response to a reduction in ¿ , the economy converges to a steady state with higher growth, a larger number of …rms, higher employment and lower unemployment.
Proof. Consider Figure 3 . Point A is the steady state reached by an economy with a high tax rate; point B is the steady state reached by an economy with a low tax rate. Consider the economy at point B. If ¿ increases, the economy is in the hysteresis region and employment, output and growth fall immediately while unemployment raises. This is the jump from point B to point C on the (GG hysterisis ) and (U U hysterisis ) loci corresponding to the high tax rate. If ¿ returns to the original value, employment, output, growth, and unemployment return to the original values. Consider now the economy at point A. If ¿ decreases, the economy jumps on the saddle path that converges to point B.
The comparative statics results for the interior steady state can be explained in two steps. First, notice that the tax raises the cost of labor and thus reduces employment and output. This means that …rm size is lower. To keep the net rate of return equal to the discount rate, the number of …rms must be lower so that there is a compensating market share e¤ect. The second step is to check the shifts of the GG and U U loci, which combined with the reduction in the number of …rms give the overall e¤ects of the higher tax on growth and unemployment. The GG locus does not shift because it does not depend directly on the tax. Hence, growth falls purely because the tax reduces competition. The U U locus, in contrast, shifts down. Hence, the tax produces higher unemployment. This is the sum of the traditional labor market e¤ect -the shift up of the U U locus -and the product market e¤ect -the reduction in N .
Consider now the dynamics subject to hysteresis. When the tax increases, the number of …rms does not change while employment falls. This reduces the …rms' scale of activity and thereby reduces growth. The reduction in output and growth yields a raise in the consumption ratio, which raises labor supply. Combined with the fall in employment, this produces higher unemployment. This chain of e¤ects is in line with traditional intuition built on models that ignore the e¤ects of the endogenous structure of the product market. Things are quite di¤erent when the number of …rms adjusts endogenously. A lower tax generates a positive feedback through the product market that reinforces the bene…ts of lower taxation. These bene…ts are reaped over time as the number of …rms raises gradually. The lower panel of Figure 3 illustrates this point by separating the pro-competitive or product market e¤ect of the lower tax rate from its traditional labor market e¤ect. Given the number of …rms, the lower tax rate yields a lower U U locus and reduces unemployment. The larger number of …rms then reduces unemployment further.
The asymmetric response of the economy to decreases and increases in the labor income tax rate requires one to distinguish the time-series implications of the model from its cross-section implications. The model predicts that countries with higher labor income taxes exhibit higher unemployment and lower growth. This is consistent with intuition. This correlation, how-ever, is very hard to detect in studies that cover several countries at a moment in time because it is dominated by country-speci…c …xed e¤ects in cross-sectional regressions. One then needs to check how variations of tax rates over time a¤ect unemployment within a country (Daveri and Tabellini 2000) . If labor taxation keeps increasing over a period of time, the timepaths of unemployment and growth track the time-path of the tax rate. More precisely, the model predicts that each time the tax rate rises, unemployment rises and growth falls. This is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for the OECD countries. They show that the upward trend in labor income tax rates drives the upward trend in unemployment and the downward trend in growth. 13 On the other hand, the model predicts that the e¤ects of tax breaks are spread over time and generate a protracted expansion of output accompanied by a falling rate of unemployment. I shall return to this aspect of the model.
The replacement ratio has e¤ects similar to those of the tax with the important di¤erence that the labor income tax reduces labor supply while the replacement ratio raises it. Hence, the tax creates less unemployment than the replacement ratio.
Factors A¤ecting Product Market Competition
Several factors determine competition in the product market; see, e.g., Geroski (1996) . The model allows me to consider -in an admittedly stylized fashion -the following:
² regulations/frictions that raise the cost of innovation can be modeled as a lower ®;
² regulations/frictions that reduce product substitution and thus price competition can be modeled as a lower ², where ² is a parameter that shifts up the function e (N; ²);
² regulations/frictions that raise entry costs for entrants but do not affect incumbents can be modeled as a higher¯.
This subsection makes the following points, which illustrate the interactions between the labor and product markets:
² lower costs of innovation raise growth and reduce unemployment;
² tougher price competition raises growth and has an ambiguous e¤ect on unemployment;
² lower barriers to entry have an ambiguous e¤ect on growth and reduce unemployment.
These results suggest that the details of the pro-competitive policy that a country adopts matter. In particular, reducing barriers to innovation is the best policy because it reduces at the same time barriers to entry and barriers to innovation within the …rm. As a result, it fosters investment on both the intensive and the extensive margin and, more importantly, it exploits the positive relation between competition and growth. I now illustrate in detail these results.
Proposition 3 E¤ects of the R&D productivity parameter, ®. (a) An economy with higher ® converges to a steady state with higher growth, a larger number of …rms, higher employment and lower unemployment. (b) In response to an increase in ®, the economy converges to a steady state with higher growth, a larger number of …rms, higher employment and lower unemployment. In response to a decrease in ®, the economy jumps to a steady state with lower growth, the same number of …rms, and the same levels of employment and unemployment.
Proof. Consider Figure 4 . Point A is the steady state reached by an economy with low ®; point B is the steady state reached by an economy with high ®. Consider the economy at point A. If ® increases, the economy jumps on the saddle path that converges to point A. If ® returns to the original value, the economy is in the hysteresis region and the number of …rms cannot fall. In other words, the temporary increase in ® locks in the larger number of …rms. This means that when ® returns to its original value there are too many …rms in the market and growth is lower. As a result, consumption rises, labor supply falls and, since employment is not a¤ected, unemployment falls. This is a jump from point B to point C on the (GG hysterisis ) and (U U hysterisis ) loci. The direct e¤ect of the higher ® is to shift up the GG locus and thus increase growth. There are no other direct e¤ects because the Y Y , LL, and U U loci do not contain ®. The higher ®, on the other hand, implies that to keep the net rate of return equal to ½ the number of …rms must rise; see (NN ). The rise in the number of …rms feeds back positively on employment, output and growth. Since output raises, growth and consumption can rise together. Labor supply falls with consumption. Combined with the rise in employment, this means that unemployment falls. The intuition for these results is that the higher ® boosts productivity of investment on both the extensive and the intensive margin. Hence, the economy supports faster growth and a large number of …rms, with all the bene…ts that follow for the labor market. Proof. Consider Figure 5 . Point B is the steady state reached by an economy with low ²; point A is the steady state reached by an economy with high ². Consider the economy at point B. If ² increases, the economy is in the hysteresis region and enters immediately a steady state with no entry whereby employment, output and growth are higher while unemployment is lower. This is a jump to point C. If ² returns to the original value, the economy returns to the original equilibrium con…guration. Consider, in contrast, the economy at point A. If ² decreases, the economy jumps on the saddle path that converges to point B.
In the product market, the direct e¤ect of tougher price competition is to raise output and growth. In the labor market, it is to raise employment and labor supply (because the consumption ratio falls). The increase in the …rms' scale of activity implies that to keep the net rate of return equal to ½ the number of …rms must fall. The intuition is that tougher price competition leads …rms to spend more on R&D, which is a …xed cost that makes incumbency more costly. Firms, on the other hand, are less pro…table because price-cost margins are lower. The fall in the number of …rms feeds back negatively on growth and employment through the rivalry e¤ect. It also raises the consumption ratio so that labor supply falls. The overall e¤ects of ², thus, depend on the balance between its positive direct e¤ect and its negative indirect e¤ect through the number of …rms. If the direct e¤ect dominates, growth and employment increase while unemployment falls. The important mechanism here is that a higher ² yields a lower N, which partially o¤sets the e¤ects of the elasticity of substitution on price competition.
Proposition 5 E¤ects of the entry cost parameter,¯. (a) An economy with higher¯converges to a steady state a smaller number of …rms, lower employment and higher unemployment. If growth is very responsive to product market competition, it is lower in the economy with the smaller number of …rms.
(b) In response to a reduction in¯, the economy converges to a steady state with a larger number of …rms, higher employment and lower unemployment. If growth is very responsive to product market competition, it is higher in the new steady state. An increase in¯has no e¤ects.
Proof. Consider Figure 6 . Point A is the steady state reached by an economy with high¯. If¯falls, the economy jumps on the saddle path that leads to the new steady state, point B. If¯returns to the original value, the economy is in the hysteresis region and enters immediately a steady state with no entry. Thus, a temporary reduction in entry costs locks-in the economy at point B. If the economy starts out at point B and¯raises, nothing happens because an increase in entry costs for an economy that is already in the hysteresis region is irrelevant since it does not a¤ect any margin.
The lower cost of entry leads to a reduction in growth. This is due to the protection e¤ect: incumbent …rms protected by high barriers to entry are larger and do more R&D. In steady state, lower growth means higher consumption, which reduces labor supply and thus reduces unemployment since employment does not depend directly on¯. The lower¯and the consequent fall in R&D spending imply that incumbency is cheaper and that the net rate of return is equal to ½ if the number of …rms rises. The larger number of …rms raises employment and feeds back on growth through its e¤ect on the …rm's scale of activity. Since output increases, the increase in growth does not require a fall in consumption, which would raise labor supply. Overall, therefore, the indirect e¤ects of the lower¯, channelled by the increase in competition, raise growth and employment and reduce unemployment. Figure 6 illustrates these e¤ects. In the upper panel, the lower¯shifts down the GG locus. Since the number of …rms raises, the e¤ect on growth is ambiguous. This is due to the tension between the protection e¤ect and the rivalry e¤ect that work in opposite directions. On the other hand, the lower¯reduces unemployment. This captures the pro-competitive e¤ect of lower barriers to entry, which is transmitted to the labor market through the condition that, given the wage, a reduction in …rms' market power requires an increase in the marginal cost of production, that is, an increase in output and employment and, therefore, lower unemployment. An important point that emerges from this discussion is that preferential treatment of incumbents in order to boost growth -a policy that can be modeled as a high¯-is self-defeating because faster growth, if it comes at all, comes at the cost of higher unemployment.
Joint Liberalization of the Labor and Product Markets
I now consider the e¤ects of a policy package that liberalizes the labor and product markets. This can be modeled as a reduction of the parameters ¿ and ¾ together with an increase in the parameter ®. In the phase diagram in Figure 7 , the border of the _ N = 0 region shifts up and the _ c = 0 locus shifts to the right. Figure 7 depicts two transition paths: the lower one generated by the liberalization of the labor market alone; the upper one generated by the liberalization of both markets. Each path takes into account the positive feedback that each market enjoys through the other market. The important result is that liberalizing both markets leads to a larger increase in the number of …rms and to a larger reduction in unemployment than liberalizing the labor market alone. There is no substitution between reforms: their e¤ects add up. The lower panel of Figure 7 illustrates this point. Lower frictions in the labor market imply a shift down of the U U locus; the pro-competitive e¤ect implies a movement along the new, lower U U locus. Liberalization of the product market implies a further movement down along the lower U U locus. The growth e¤ect of this policy package is positive because the GG locus shift up and the number of …rms rises.
Examination of the transition yields further interesting implications. There is an initial jump up in consumption and growth. This is feasible because employment and output raise due to the liberalization of the labor market. Moreover, with a predetermined number of …rms, the jump up in output implies a jump up in production per …rm, which triggers more R&D spending per …rm and thus faster growth. The jump up in consumption implies a drop in labor supply, which combined with the jump up in employment produces a drop in unemployment. Along the transition path, consumption and the number of …rms rise. Accordingly, employment and output rise. Growth is subject to the upward pressure due to increasing competition and the downward pressure due to falling market shares. If the rivalry e¤ect dominates the market share e¤ect, growth rises throughout the transition. Unemployment is subject to the downward pressure due to the increase in employment resulting from the increase in competition and the e¤ect of the change in labor supply resulting from the change in the consumption ratio. This is subject to two forces: the downward pressure due to increasing competition that pushes up R&D spending by …rms, and the upward pressure due to the slowing down of investment in entry. Overall, labor supply is subject to forces that it is plausible to think cancel out. Hence, the dynamics of unemployment are determined by the rise in employment so that unemployment falls throughout the transition.
Conclusion
The view that unemployment is high in economies where the welfare state provides long-lasting unemployment bene…ts that are unrelated to the individual's e¤ort to …nd work, the labor force is organized in sectoral or …rm-level unions that do not coordinate their activities, and taxation raises the cost of labor, is generally correct and supported by much of the available empirical evidence. It is, however, incomplete because it ignores the characteristics of the product market. There are good reasons, theoretical and empirical, to think that in addition to labor market frictions, unemployment depends on a broad class of factors that characterize the structure of the product market. An interesting implication of this argument is that there exists a relation between unemployment and growth. The reason is that growth is driven by …rms' R&D investments, which are a¤ected by the structure of the product market.
In this paper, I discussed a model where unions have control over the wage and set it above the market-clearing level. Unemployment is thus generated by their exercise of market power. Because both the labor and product markets are imperfectly competitive, market power in the labor market interacts with market power in the product market. This interaction sheds new light on the e¤ects of policy interventions on unemployment and growth. For example, labor market reforms that reduce labor costs reduce unemployment and boost growth because they expand the scale of the economy and generate more competition in the product market. Moreover, the reduction in unemployment is larger than one would expect if the reforms' e¤ects in the product market were ignored. If such reforms are implemented jointly with a reduction of barriers to innovation an even larger reduction in unemployment is achieved. The output market clearing condition requires
Since entry is non-negative, one has _ N > 0 for Y > C + NR Z and _ N = 0 otherwise. This condition identi…es two regions in (N; c) space: the entry region, where entry is pro…table, and the hysteresis region, where entry is not pro…table and the number of …rms is …xed. Dividing through by Z and using the growth strategy (17) Figure 3 . In the entry region to the right of (N ¤ ; c ¤ ) there is a saddle path leading to that point. All points on the _ c = 0 locus to the right of (N ¤ ; c ¤ ) are steady states. The stable manifold of the system is the union of the saddle path in the entry region and the portion of the _ c = 0 locus inside the no entry region. Paths above the stable manifold eventually yield in…nite c and violate the transversality condition for the …rm's optimal plan. Paths below the stable manifold eventually cross the horizontal axis and yield zero or negative c. Hence, whenever N < N ¤ the economy jumps on the saddle path and converges to the steady state; whenever N¸N ¤ the economy jumps on the _ c = 0 locus and enters a steady state with no entry.
